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Abstract:
The government of Kenya has employed a wide range of strategies to undermine the recentlydismissed prosecutions of President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto before the
International Criminal Court (ICC). This Article argues that these strategies are part of an integrated
backlash campaign against the ICC, one that encompasses seemingly unrelated actions in multiple
global, regional and national venues. We identify three overarching themes that connect these diverse
measures—politicizing complementarity, regionalizing political opposition, and pairing instances of
cooperation and condemnation to diffuse accusations of impunity. By linking its discrete acts of
opposition to these three themes, the government ultimately increased the effectiveness of its
campaign against the Court. Our findings provide new evidence to analyze others instances of
backlash against international courts and institutions.
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I.

Introduction
Over the last several years, the government of Kenya has employed a wide range of strategies

to undermine the prosecutions of President Uhuru Kenyatta (“Kenyatta”) and Deputy President
William Ruto (“Ruto”) before the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”). In 2011,
Kenyatta and Ruto were charged with crimes against humanity for inciting widespread violence in
the country following the presidential election held on December 27, 2007. 1 The government of
Kenya responded by challenging the cases and attacking the Court. These efforts significantly—and
ultimately successfully—undermined both prosecutions. The case against Kenyatta was dismissed in
December 2014 on what the ICC Prosecutor called “a dark day for international criminal justice.”2
Ruto’s prosecution was dismissed on April 5, 2016.3
This Article reviews and analyzes Kenya’s concerted and unprecedented backlash against the
ICC. We identify the diverse measures taken by the government in multiple venues to oppose the ICC
prosecutions and explain how they amount to an integrated backlash strategy against the Court and
its Prosecutor. Part II provides relevant background, briefly discussing the tensions surrounding the
ICC’s work in Africa before the Kenyatta and Ruto prosecutions began. Part III places the
prosecutions in context, summarizing the post-election violence and the charges against each
defendant relating to that violence. Part IV—the heart of the article—describes the different actions
by which the Kenyan government opposed the ICC prosecutions. Part V highlights three overarching
themes of Kenya’s an integrated backlash strategy against the ICC. A brief conclusion identifies the
implications of this Article’s findings for future research on backlashes against other international

1

See International Criminal Court: Situation in the Republic of Kenya, https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya?ln=en.
Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the Withdrawal of Charges
Against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=Adjourn-Kenyatta05-12-2014.
3
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of
Acquittal, ICC-01/09-01/11 (April 5, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02617.pdf.
2
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courts and tribunals. Part VI briefly concludes, identifying the implications of our findings for future
research on backlashes against international courts and other international institutions.
II.

Background: Africa and the ICC
Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, many African governments saw the need for a

permanent international criminal justice regime to confront mass human rights violations on the
continent and protect weaker nations.4 In 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
was adopted at a diplomatic conference sponsored by the United Nations (“UN”),5 leading, in 2002,
to the creation of the first permanent international criminal tribunal. The ICC is tasked with
investigating and prosecuting crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes that occur on the
territory of a State party, that are committed by the national of a State Party, or that are referred to
the Court by the UN Security Council (“UNSC” or “the Security Council”).
African nations comprise the largest regional group of countries in the ICC Assembly of States
Parties (“ASP”).6 However, the prosecution of President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan for international
crimes committed in the Darfur region of that country proved to be a turning point in African
governments’ support for the ICC.7 The Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC
in March 2005. After the Prosecutor applied for a warrant for al-Bashir’s arrest on July 14, 2008,8 the
African Union Peace and Security Council (“AU PSC”) requested a one-year deferral of the

4

Id. See GERARD WERLE ET AL., Introduction, in AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2 (2014).
John M. Mbaku, International Justice: The International Criminal Court and Africa, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE: AFRICAN
GROWTH INITIATIVE (Dec. 2013), http://goo.gl/Y4FNXt.
6
Tim Murithi, Policy Brief No. 8: The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled
Relationship?, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION at 1(Mar. 2013) , http://goo.gl/qs7gFt. Of the 134 States
Parties to the Rome Statute, 34 are African States. United Nations Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en. (last visited
May 19, 2016).
7
Id. See generally Kurt Mills, Bashir is Dividing Us: Africa and the International Criminal Court, 34 HUM. RTS. Q.
404 (2012).
8
Case Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Mar.
26, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf.
5
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investigation by the UNSC—a procedure permitted by the Rome Statute.9 However, on March 4,
2009, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity.10
The next day, the AU PSC issued a second communique requesting deferral.11 The UNSC’s failure
to respond positively or negatively to these requests aroused a feeling of disrespect among African
political leaders.12
Expressing regret that the UNSC failed to defer the cases, the African Union (“AU”) formally
decided, in July 2009, not to cooperate with the ICC in facilitating al-Bashir’s arrest.13 Accusations
that the Office of the Prosecutor was targeting Africa began in earnest around this time.14 Critics
pointed to the fact that all ongoing ICC prosecutions were focused on Africa, despite the fact that
African governments had referred several of these cases to the Court. These tensions underlie Kenya’s
subsequent backlash against the ICC in response to the Kenyatta and Ruto prosecutions.
III.

Overview of the ICC Prosecutions of Kenyatta and Ruto
Ethnic tensions and violence have been linked to elections in Kenya since the country’s

independence, in part due to the congruence of tribal and electoral boundaries.15 After Mwai Kimbaki
of the Party of National Unity (“PNU”) was declared the winner of the election held on December
27, 2007, supporters of his Orange Democratic Movement (“ODM”) opponent, Raila Odinga, alleged
electoral fraud. Tribal violence between the candidates’ constituencies erupted, including murder,
rape, deportation, and forcible transfer of populations. The violence, which lasted three months,

9

AU Peace and Security Council [AUPSC], Communique of the 142nd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council,
PSC/MIN/Comm.(CXLII) (July 21, 2008), http://goo.gl/3U85j3.
10
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (Mar. 4,
2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
11
AUPSC, Communique of the 175th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, PSC/PR/Comm.(CLXXV) (March 5,
2009), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/iccarrestwarranteng.pdf.
12
DAVID HOILE, JUSTICE DENIED BY THE ICC: THE REALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 206 (2014).
13
Assembly of the African Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, July 1–3, 2009, Decision on the Meeting of African
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in Decisions and Declarations, ¶ 10,
Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII), http://goo.gl/7QiQ1S.
14
Murithi, supra note 6, at 3.
15
HOILE, supra note 12, at 312–14 (providing a detailed account of the events precipitating the trials).
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resulted in more than 1,100 civilian deaths and the internal displacement of over 350,000
individuals.16
The Kenyan government created the Commission to Investigate Post-Election
Violence (“CIPEV”) in February 2008, to investigate the events.17 President Kimbaki and Prime
Minister Odinga sanctioned the Commission’s creation and pledged in writing to implement its entire
Report.18 At the conclusion of its investigation, the CIPEV produced a sealed list of suspects and a
report identifying “planning and organization by businessman, politicians and others” as a cause of
the violence.19 The CIPEV report also noted a cycle of impunity in Kenya, reflected in consistent
failure to hold high-level government officials criminally responsible for their actions.20 The Report
stated that a list of suspects would be delivered to the ICC Prosecutor unless the government
established a new domestic court—a Special Tribunal for Kenya tasked with investigating the crimes
and trying the perpetrators.21 The Kenyan Parliament never constituted the Tribunal.22
Accordingly, former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan delivered the list of suspects to the
ICC Prosecutor, whose request to initiate an independent investigation was granted in March 2010.
The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed charges against both Kenyatta23 and Ruto24 in January 2012. The
Chamber charged Ruto with the crimes against humanity of murder, deportation or forcible transfer

16

Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence 293, 345 (Oct. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Waki
Report] http://kenyastockholm.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/the-waki-report.pdf (last visited May 20, 2016).
17
Id. at vii. CIPEV is also referred to colloquially as the “Waki Commission.”
18
Catherine Akurut, Kenya: Involvement of the ICC in the 2007 Post-Election Violence, IN ON AFRICA (Oct. 2012),
http://goo.gl/GVXDHV.
19
Waki Report, supra note 16, at 347.
20
Id. at ix.
21
Id. at 473.
22
How Kenya Handled Local Tribunal Process, DAILY NATION (Sept. 17, 2013), http://goo.gl/Nrhl6d (providing a
detailed account of attempts to constitute the Tribunal). The narrative surrounding attempts to prosecute Kenyatta and
Ruto domestically is developed in Part V(D), which follows.
23
Case Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Mar. 13,
2015) [hereinafter Ruto Information Sheet], https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/KenyattaEng.pdf.
24
Case Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/RutoKosgeySangEng.pdf.
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of populations, and persecution. 25 The Court charged Kenyatta with crimes against humanity,
including murder, rape, persecution, deportation or forcible transfer, and other inhumane acts.26
Initially, the ICC prosecutions enjoyed widespread public support in Kenya. 27 But that
support did not survive the defendants’ 2013 presidential campaign. After the Pre-Trial Chamber
confirmed the charges, Kenyatta and Ruto became political allies, forming the Jubilee Coalition in
advance of the election.28 Public support for the trials persisted,29 however, and remained high in the
months leading up to the vote.30 Accordingly, promises to cooperate with the ICC were a pillar of the
defendants’ campaign.31 The pair framed the indictments as a personal matter that would not interfere
with their ability to govern.32 Yet even as the defendants pledged cooperation, Kenyatta and Ruto
villainized the ICC as a tool of Western nations seeking to meddle in the Kenyan electoral process.33
This dual strategy—pledging cooperation while raising objections to the prosecution based on
Kenya’s sovereignty—allowed the defendants to avoid the appearance of shirking accountability
while increasing public support for their anti-colonial narrative against the ICC.
Kenyatta and Ruto were elected as President and Deputy President of Kenya, respectively, on
March 9, 2013. After the elections, public support for the trials declined precipitously.34 Reasons for
the decline in public approval included: (1) Kenyatta and Ruto’s election; (2) the Prosecutor’s

25

Id.
Ruto Information Sheet, supra note 24, at 1.
27
Review Report, THE KENYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION (KNDR) MONITORING PROJECT 12 (October
2010), http://www.katibainstitute.org/Archives/images/KNDR%20Review%20Report%202010.pdf.
28
Alex Perry, Kenya’s Election: What Uhuru Kenyatta’s Victory Means for Kenya, TIME (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://world.time.com/2013/03/09/kenyas-election-what-uhuru-kenyattas-victory-means-for-africa/.
29
D.H., Public Opinion in Kenya: Politics and Justice, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 10, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2012/10/public-opinion-kenya.
30
Kenya’s 2013 General Election: A Review of Preparedness, THE KENYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION
(KNDR) MONITORING PROJECT 26 (Feb. 2013),
http://www.katibainstitute.org/Archives/images/KNDR%20Review%20Report%202013.pdf.
31
Michela Wrong, Indictee for President!, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013) http://goo.gl/sbiLZf.
32
Sarah McGregor, Kenya’s Kenyatta, Facing ICC Charges, Wins Presidential Vote, BLOOMBERG NEWS (March 9,
2013), http://goo.gl/Vsm9pF.
33
Perry, supra note 28. For example, the campaign issued a statement expressing deep concern “about the shadowy,
suspicious and rather animated involvement of the British High Commissioner in Kenya’s election.” Id.
34
Kenya and the International Criminal Court: It’s Show Time, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Show
Time] http://goo.gl/RpUzuC.
26
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decision to drop the case against Francis Muthuara—the Head of Public Service and Secretary to the
Cabinet; 35 and (3) the trials’ extensive delay. 36 The defendants’ also continued their Janus-faced
strategy,37 criticizing the ICC more pointedly,38 while continuing to emphasize their cooperation with
the process.39
Ruto’s trial opened on September 10, 2013.40 Kenyatta’s was scheduled to begin on December
19, 2013; however, the Prosecutor requested a deferral until October 7, 2014, citing the Kenyan
government’s failure to provide requested evidence. 41 That deferral was granted. A series of
additional deferral requests followed.42 Finally, on December 5, 2014, the ICC Prosecutor withdrew
the charges against Kenyatta, citing a lack of evidence.43 On October 26, 2015 Ruto moved for a
judgment of acquittal.44 On April 5, 2016 the court dismissed the case against Ruto, citing insufficient
evidence.45

35

The Kenyan government’s recalcitrance, discussed in Section V(H), contributed to the withdrawal of the ICC
indictment against Muthuara. The Prosecutor cited the Kenyan government’s failure to help uncover evidence “that
would have been crucial, or at the very least, may have been useful” as contributing to the case’s dismissal. Prosecutor
v. Francis Kirimi Muthuara and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution Notification of the
Withdrawal of Charges Against Francis Mirimi Muthuara, Office of the Prosecutor 6 (Mar. 11, 2013), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_01871.PDF.
36
Felix Olick, International Criminal Court Losing Public Support on Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto Trials,
STANDARD DIGITAL 2 (April 25, 2013), http://goo.gl/xhv4yX; see also The ICC Issue and Raila’s Political Future,
IPSOS (July 2013), http://goo.gl/FPYGKO.
37
Tomas Zak, Kenyatta in Court: The ICC Needs to Start Winning Some Public Perception Battles, ALLAFRICA (Nov.
12, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/201311121077.html.
38
See, e.g., “Uhuru Kenyatta says ICC Trial no Longer a Personal Obligation,” DAILY NATION (Oct. 14, 2013),
http://goo.gl/lO9sSu.
39
Uhuru Blasts US, UK in his AU Speech, NEWVISION (Oct. 13, 2013), http://goo.gl/VVUH3V. The complex
relationship between these strategies and public opinion is discussed throughout.
40
Case Information Sheet: The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, supra note 24.
41
Gabriele Steinhauser, International Criminal Court Delays Trial Against Kenya’s President, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Sept. 5, 2014), http://goo.gl/cIR5S2.
42
Kenya Cases at the International Criminal Court: Timeline, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MONITOR,
http://www.ijmonitor.org/kenya-cases-timeline/ (last visited May 5, 2016).
43
Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Notice of the Withdrawal of the Charges Against
Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Office of the Prosecutor (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09939.PDF.
44
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Corrigendum of Ruto Defence Request for Judgment of
Acquittal, ICC-01/09-01/11 (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_20293.PDF.
45
Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of
Acquittal, ICC-01/09-01/11 (April 5, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02617.pdf.
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IV.

Identifying Different Instances of Backlash against the ICC
International and domestic media reports from the last several years have been peppered with

fragments of the Kenyan government’s backlash against the ICC resulting from the Kenyatta and
Ruto prosecutions. This section of the article puts those pieces together, presenting a narrative
summary of the major instances of backlash against the ICC.46 The summary illuminates the striking
diversity and range of backlash strategies. Some aspects of the government’s campaign—such as
lobbying the Security Council for a deferral, proposing amendments to the Rome Statute, and urging
transfer to a national or regional judicial forum—appear to work within the framework of the ICC
legal regime. But others—notably, threatening national and regional withdrawal from the Rome
Statute, refusing to cooperate with the Prosecutor, and using rhetoric to politicize the trials—reveal
the government’s open hostility to the Court. Our review of seemingly discrete instances of backlash
sets the stage for Part V, in which we explain how these efforts are part of a larger integrated backlash
strategy marked by several unifying patterns.
A. Lobbying the U.N. Security Council to Defer or Terminate the ICC Prosecutions
Article 16 of the Rome Statute permits the UNSC to defer ICC investigations or
prosecutions.47 With the backing of the African Union (“AU”), the Kenyan government filed two
deferral requests with the Security Council, neither of which was granted. It also unsuccessfully
asked the UNSC to terminate the ICC proceedings against Kenyatta and Ruto. At first blush, Kenya’s

46

See also Sosteness Francis Materu, THE POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KENYA: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL RESPONSES 231–40 (2014) (providing a narrative account and analysis of several of these strategies, including
threats of withdrawal from the Rome Statute, efforts to resort to regional criminal jurisdictions, and requests to the
UNSC for deferral); Lionel Nichols, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE END OF IMPUNITY IN KENYA 156
(2015) (providing a narrative account and analysis of several of these strategies in support of the thesis that Kenya’s
government constructed a “foreign affairs façade” by coupling backlash with shows of cooperation—one of the patterns
identified in this Article in sub-section V(C)).
47
“No investigation may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the
Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.” Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, art. 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), http://goo.gl/be0NIE.
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requests appeared to be genuine efforts to delay or end the prosecutions. In fact, as we now explain,
Kenya anticipated the failure of all three requests. The government used each rejection to strengthen
the narrative that the defendants’ prosecutions were evidence of a deeper problem: Africa’s
marginalization by the West. That narrative politicized the ICC, undermining its legitimacy.
Kenya began pushing for an Article 16 deferral in late 2010, but did not submit a formal
request at that time. 48 Instead, Kenya gathered regional support for position to block the ICC
prosecutions. The AU, at its Summit in January 2011, issued a Decision endorsing Kenya’s attempt
to obtain a UNSC deferral of the Kenyatta and Ruto cases. 49 The AU’s politically charged
endorsement refers to several aspects of the mounting tensions between the ICC and the African
regional body. First, the Decision notes the UNSC’s failure to act on earlier AU requests to defer ICC
proceedings against President al-Bashir.50 Second, it approves the Kenyan government’s decision to
receive al-Bashir during a visit to the country in 2010 51 —despite his outstanding ICC arrest
warrant52—as implementing AU Assembly decisions seeking to promote regional peace and security.
Finally, the Decision reiterates the AU’s support for an amendment to Article 16, proposed in 2009,
and discussed below, to empower the UN General Assembly to pursue deferral where the UNSC
“fails to act.”53
The AU Decision cites two primary reasons in support of a deferral: deference to national
prosecutions in line with the principle of complementarity, and Kenya’s critical role in ensuring

48

Update Report Number 1: Kenya and the ICC, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (April 6, 2011),
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-6717579.php.
49
Assembly of the African Union, Sixteenth Ordinary Session, Jan. 30–31, 2011, Decision on the Implementation of the
Decisions on the International Criminal Court, in Decisions, Declarations, and Resolution, ¶ 6, Assembly/AU/Dec.332361(XVI) [hereinafter Sixteenth Session Decision], http://goo.gl/qXvsY1.
50
Id. at ¶ 3.
51
Id. at ¶ 5.
52
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, supra note 10.
53
Sixteenth Session Decision, supra note 49, ¶ 6, 9. See also Max du Plessis & Chris Gevers, Kenya’s Deferral Request
and the Proposed Amendment to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 19, 2011) [hereinafter Deferral &
Article 16], http://goo.gl/FCyEe9 (discussing Kenya’s proposed amendment to Art. 16).
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regional peace and security.54 The principle of complementarity is one of the hallmarks of the ICC’s
jurisdiction, reflecting the understanding that states have the primary responsibility to prosecute
international crimes in their respective national legal systems. The ICC may commence an
investigation only where a state is unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate and prosecute such
crimes. The principle is also based on considerations of efficiency and effectiveness, since officials
in the country where atrocities occurred generally have superior access to evidence and witnesses and
the means to investigate and prosecute offenses.55 The AU’s reference to complementarity to justify
a deferral is thus linked to a broader narrative developed by Kenya to support its backlash against the
ICC—that domestic or regional prosecutions are more legitimate than those in the Hague.
Following the AU decision, the Kenyan government formally requested a deferral on March
4, 2011.56 The Security Council addressed the request in an interactive dialogue two weeks later,
expressing concern that Kenya’s newly brokered Coalition government was not united in seeking a
deferral.57 Kenya’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations subsequently submitted a letter
explaining that the Coalition government had reached a consensus on the issue, noting that the ODM
Party no longer opposed deferral. Curiously, however, the ODM Party’s Secretary subsequently sent
a letter to the Council reiterating the party’s opposition.58 Reportedly, several nations on the Council
expressed a preference that Kenya pursue its grievances under Article 19 of the Rome Statute, the
provision dealing with challenges to the ICC’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of a case.59 After

54

Id. at ¶ 6.
Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in
Practice 3 (2003), https://goo.gl/jpQ1HS.
56
Macharia Kama, Request of Kenya for Deferral under Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, United Nations Security Council, S/2011/201 (Mar. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Kamau Deferral Request] (discussing
letter dated March 4, 2011, requesting deferral in ¶ 1), http://goo.gl/TTcFQ7.
57
Update Report Number 1: Kenya and the ICC, supra note 48.
58
Id.
59
Id.
55
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further consultations on April 8, 2011, the Security Council did not respond to the deferral request—
a decision well within its discretion.60
Two years later, Kenya expanded its arguments to the Security Council against the
prosecutions. On May 2, 2013, Kenya’s Permanent Representative to the U.N. submitted a note
verbale requesting the cases’ immediate termination, stating: “What this delegation is asking for is
not deferral. What this delegation is asking for is for the immediate termination of the case at the
Hague without much further ado.”61 The further stated that “[a] lot has changed in the past two and a
half years; we submit that Kenya has the capacity to offer a home grown solution.”62
According to a senior Security Council diplomat, the legal basis for this argument is dubious:
“The letter from the Kenyans is slightly bizarre because they are actually asking the Security Council
to do something it has no authority to do,” since it can, at most, defer the cases.63 The ICC Prosecutor
also criticized the termination request as a “backdoor attempt to politicize the ICC process.”64 The
proposal nevertheless received a warm reception from Rwanda’s U.N. Ambassador, who praised the
note as making a “compelling case against the methods of work of the Office of the Prosecutor” and
lamented that the ICC failed to live up to the aspiration that the Court would “be independent from
political interference” and “uphold the sovereign equality of States.”65
Interestingly, in his capacity as Deputy President, Ruto stated that the Permanent
Representative’s termination request did not in fact reflect the Kenyan government’s position.66 This
60

Chronology of Events: Kenya and the ICC, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (updated Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/kenya.php (discussing meeting on April 8, 2011).
61
Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations, No. 617/13 (May 3, 2013),
http://councilandcourt.org/files/2012/11/KenyaNoteVerbale.pdf.
62
Kenya Asks UN to Halt ICC Charges Against Kenyatta, BBC NEWS AFRICA (May 9, 2013),
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sentiment was mirrored by Kenya’s Attorney General. 67 Commentators at the time voiced
considerable skepticism about the Ambassador’s authority to act unilaterally, speculating that the
disavowals were intended to create a veneer of distance between the Kenyan government and efforts
to resist the ICC process.68 That distance would have created an illusion of cooperation consistent
with Ruto’s campaign promises, an issue discussed further in Section V(C).
On May 13, 2013, the Security Council received a follow-up letter from Kenya requesting an
interactive dialogue on the deferral request. At the dialogue, held on May 23, 2013, the UNSC again
showed no inclination to intervene. Most Security Council members, including the United States,
France and the United Kingdom, 69 maintained that deferral was inappropriate because the
prosecutions did not threaten international peace and security and because Kenya’s grievances would
be more appropriately addressed in future meetings of the ASP.70
The African Union responded four days later by adopting a “Decision on Africa’s
Relationship with the International Criminal Court.” 71 The decision reiterated the AU’s claim of
complementarity—that “Kenya has primary jurisdiction over the investigations and prosecutions of
crimes in relation to the 2007 post-election violence”—and the need to defer the cases in light of
Kenya’s role in preserving national and regional peace and stability.72
The deferral issue arose for a third time in October 2013 when the AU debated whether
African states should withdraw en masse from the Rome Statute, an issue discussed in Section
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IV(C).73 The final AU Decision, adopted on October 12, did not call for mass withdrawal; instead it
stated that Kenya should again seek a deferral from the UNSC,74 which Kenya did in a second formal
deferral request a few days later.75 The same AU decision also requested that the ICC suspend the
proceedings until the UNSC had considered the request,76 and further asserted that until such time
President Kenyatta would not appear before the ICC.77
The UNSC held a vote on a draft resolution on the Kenya deferral request on November 15,
2013.78 The resolution received seven affirmative votes, two short of the nine votes required for
adoption.79 Of the ten rotating members, five—Argentina, Australia, Guatemala, Luxembourg and
Republic of—abstained. The five other members—Azerbaijan, Morocco, Pakistan, Rwanda and
Togo—voted in favor of adoption. Three permanent members—the United States, United Kingdom
and France—abstained; China and Russia, voted in favor.
There is strong evidence that Kenya pressed the UNSC to vote on the draft resolution although
it expected that its efforts would fail. At an interactive dialogue with the AU Contact Group held in
late October, a majority of Security Council members expressed their opposed to the deferral
request.80 It thus appears that Kenya’s objective was to link its deferral request to broader criticisms
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that the Security Council does not give sufficient credence to the views of African governments.81
That position was confirmed by Tekeda Alemu, who, speaking as the Chair of the AU, remarked that
the decision illustrated distrust in African leaders. 82 The vote may also have advanced Kenya’s
efforts, discussed in Section IV(D), to distract the international community from the fact that—
despite the emphasis its deferral requests placed on complementarity—the government was not, in
fact, making meaningful efforts to investigate the defendants’ crimes.
The doubtful legal viability of a deferral request rooted in complementarity provides
additional evidence to support the strategic nature of the deferral requests. Although deferral requests
by both the Kenyan government and the African Union repeatedly cite complementarity, Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter provides only for Security Council action precipitated by threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. 83 Commentators have asserted that because
complementarity is not linked to any of these events, it does not provide a valid legal basis for an
Article 16 deferral.84 The requests’ emphasis on complementarity notwithstanding its weak legal
basis is thus consistent with furthering a broader political narrative framing the ICC as a tool of
Western powers and a threat to Kenya’s sovereignty.85
Kenya and the AU, however, seem to consider deferral an open issue. As recently as October
20, 2015, Kenya’s Permanent Ambassador to the UN submitted a letter to the UNSC requesting
deferral pending an audit of the witnesses against Ruto. The letter emphasized that the AU remains
“actively seized” of the “unresolved” matter and reiterated that the “serious political and social
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distraction” caused by the prosecutions continues to undermine the “immediate and long term
political stability” of Kenya and the Horn of Africa.”86
B. Motions by the Kenyan Parliament to Withdraw from the Rome Statute
Following the ICC indictments of Kenyatta and Ruto, the National Assembly of Kenya
adopted two motions to withdraw from the Rome Statute and to repeal domestic legislation
proscribing the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Both motions were direct reactions to the
prosecutions—one came a week after the suspects were named and the second preceded an AU
Summit discussing an en masse withdrawal of African nations from the ICC. Although neither motion
was approved, as public demonstrations of the desire of many Kenya legislators to withdraw from
the Rome Statute, the motions helped garner support for the African-wide ICC withdrawal proposal
discussed below.
Article 127 provides for the withdrawal of a state that had previously ratified the Rome
Statute.87 However, neither of the Kenyan Parliament’s withdrawal motions could have undermined
the legal basis for prosecuting Kenyatta or Ruto.88 The investigations began when Kenya was a party
to the Rome Statute, and Article 127 expressly provides that withdrawal affects neither “proceedings
in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior
to the date on which the withdrawal became effective,” nor “continued consideration of any matter
which was already under consideration by the Court.”89
Nevertheless, Kenya’s withdrawal would likely have had a major prospective impact on the
Court. As one of the most powerful African states, the country’s denunciation of the Rome Statute
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would have sent a strong political message. Given the link that the Kenyan government consistently
drew between the “West” and the ICC, withdrawal would have contributed to the perception of the
West’s declining relations with an economically up-and-coming Kenya, a particularly salient issue in
light of improving economic ties between Kenya and China.90
The Parliament’s first motion to withdraw from the Rome Statute and to repeal the
International Crimes Act 91 passed a week after the naming of the suspects in the post-election
violence.92 The motion, which followed several failed attempts to pass a bill create a Special Tribunal
for Kenya, 93 emphasized that, in light of the 2010 constitutional reforms, the cases against the
suspects should be tried domestically.94 Although the motion passed overwhelmingly in Parliament,
it was never acted upon by then-President Kibaki.
A second motion, which followed the 2013 elections, also urged immediate withdrawal from
the Rome Statute and the repeal of the International Crimes Act.95 This motion reiterated that the
constitutional reforms had created a competent national judiciary and emphasized the lawful election
of Kenyatta and Ruto.96 The motion’s sponsor also cited the need to protect Kenya’s sovereignty, the
increasing politicization of the ICC, and the refusal of Western powers, including the United States,
to sign the Rome Statute.97 These rationales for withdrawal suggests concern that the indictments
would interfere with the defendant’s constitutional responsibilities and, thereby, demonstrate a lack
of respect for the Kenyan people’s political will. The motion thus bolstered the narrative that the
90
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ICC’s refusal to allow Kenya to investigate the cases itself reflected both a lack of respect for its
sovereignty and the Court’s Western bias.
Additionally, the Parliament considered the 2013 motion shortly before the AU’s discussion
of an en masse African withdrawal from the ICC.98 The motion’s adoption increased the credibility
of the collective withdrawal threat. After its passage, Kenya secured the two-thirds majority required
to convene an AU Extraordinary Summit to consider the matter. 99 The prospect of Kenya’s
withdrawal also reinforced the regional political conversation framing the ICC as a neo-colonial tool,
a theme first raised in response to the al-Bashir case.100
Under the Kenyan Constitution, the President must assent to bills passed by Parliament to
complete the legislative process.101 President Kenyatta did not act on the 2013 motion102—perhaps
because of his election campaign platform promising to cooperate with the ICC.103 The decision
distanced Ruto and Kenyatta from backlash efforts by the legislative branch. So did the removal—
during debate—of language urging the suspension of “any links, cooperation and assistance with the
International Criminal Court.”104 Such shows of cooperation bolstered the pair’s domestic popularity,
thereby making later attacks on the ICC more potent.105
Kenya’s governmental structure facilitated the country’s ability to broadcast strategically
discordant messages about the ICC. The Parliament’s adoption of the motions and the government’s
support for an AU Extraordinary Summit signaled Kenya’s willingness to withdraw from the Rome
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Statute. Yet even as the Parliament rejected the trials on the behalf of the people, President Kenyatta,
in keeping with his campaign promises, declined to reject them as head of the executive branch. The
veneer of cooperation that Kenyatta and Ruto maintained prevented the government from appearing
indefensibly uncooperative. This facilitated the generation of regional support for the masse
withdrawal proposal and also allowed the two officials to simultaneously mobilize—but divorce
themselves from—other anti-ICC lobbying efforts.
C. En Masse Withdrawal from the Rome Statute
Kenya proposed an Extraordinary Summit on the ICC in October 2013 after the passage of its
second motion to withdraw from the Rome Statute. At the Summit, AU members discussed the
possibility of an en masse withdrawal from the Rome Statute but, as explained below, ultimately
decided against this. Instead, the AU adopted two resolutions challenging the ICC prosecutions of
Kenyatta and Ruto—that Heads of State should be immune from international prosecution during
their terms of office, and that Kenya should request a deferral of the ICC proceedings from the UNSC.
Kenyan officials led the charge for an en masse AU withdrawal, requesting the meeting and
securing the two-thirds majority vote required to call an Extraordinary Summit. 106 Reportedly,
Kenyan diplomats traveled throughout the continent to solicit other countries’ support. 107 Their
efforts were aided by the fact that thirty-four of the African Union’s fifty-four member states are
parties to the Rome Statute.108

106

Solomon Dersso, African Union Summit on the ICC—Extraordinary Solidarity of Elites (Oct. 12, 2013),
http://solomondersso.wordpress.com/2013/10/12/the-trouble-with-african-leadership-solidarity-for-self-protection/.
107
Ludger Schadomsky, The African Union Debates Its Relationship with the International Criminal Court, DW (Oct.
11, 2013), http://goo.gl/hFFHwa.
108
Michelle McKenna, African Union Requests Security Council to Defer Cases of Kenyatta and Ruto, Human Security
Centre (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.hscentre.org/sub-saharan-africa/african-union-requests-security-council-to-defercases-of-kenyatta-and-ruto/.

21

At the Summit, President Kenyatta gave an impassioned speech, declaring that the ICC
“stopped being the home of justice the day it became the toy of declining imperial powers.” 109
Kenyatta further lambasted the prosecutions as an affront to African sovereignty, stating: “These
interventions go beyond internal interference with the affairs of a sovereign State. They constitute a
fetid insult to Kenya and Africa. African sovereignty means nothing to the ICC and its patrons.”110
Kenyatta also attempted to galvanize other AU member states by emphasizing that the U.S.
and U.K. had refused to join the Rome Statute due to sovereignty concerns and fears of political
prosecutions. He used this charge to argue that the Court “performs on the cue of European and
American governments against the sovereignty of African States.”111 Yet Kenyatta simultaneously
emphasized his cooperation with the ICC, stating: “From the beginning of the cases I have fully
cooperated with the Court . . . I have attended court whenever required and complied with every
requirement made of me in connection with my case.”112 The AU press release struck a similar theme,
asserting that “throughout this difficult period, Kenya has, in word and in deed expressed its
willingness to cooperate with the [ICC].”113
A vote on masse withdrawal was held, but the proposal failed to garner the required two-thirds
majority. No official tally of the votes was released.114 However, reports suggested a divide between
Anglophone nations, which largely supported withdrawal, and Francophone nations, which largely
opposed.115 According to these reports the nations supporting masse withdrawal included Ethiopia,
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Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe, while the countries opposed included the
Ivory Coast, Gambia, Mali and Botswana.116 According to a report by ThinkAfricaPress, the latter
nations cited past failures to confront impunity as a reason to continue engaging with the ICC.117
However, the AU members voted in favor of giving immunity to sitting Heads of State, a backlash
strategy discussed below in subsection F(3), and endorsed Kenya’s pursuit of an Article 16 deferral,
discussed above in subsection A.
D. Attempts to Prosecute International Crimes Before Domestic Courts
The ICC indictments followed multiple unsuccessful attempts in the Kenyan Parliament to
constitute a Special Tribunal for Kenya. The Kenyan government nevertheless took the position that
the ICC proceedings infringed on the nation’s right to investigate and prosecute international crimes
at home and shirked the Court’s responsibility to expand Kenya’s capacity to try such cases
domestically.
The CIPEV Report set a deadline for establishing a Special Tribunal for Kenya. It
required that representatives sign an agreement to establish the Special Tribunal within sixty days of
the Report’s publication, and that a statute incorporating the agreement come into force within an
additional forty five days. If the Tribunal were not constituted by that date, the CIPEV would hand
over the names of the suspects listed in the report to the ICC Prosecutor. The outlook for creating a
Special Tribunal initially seemed positive, but ultimately the Parliament did not adopt any of the bills
to establish the court.118
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The National Assembly failed to adopt the first bill to create a Special Tribunal, together with
the Constitutional reforms required to make it viable, in February 2009.119 UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan twice extended the Report’s deadline to facilitate the Tribunal’s creation.120 In August
2009 a second bill was proposed, but never debated due to the lack of a Parliamentary quorum. No
subsequent attempt to establish a Tribunal received a quorum.
The government also proposed that a Truth and Justice Reconciliation Commission
investigate the post-election violence. The Commission was originally created to investigate and
accurately record human rights violations that occurred between 1963 and 2008—a window that
included the post-election violence. 121 However, the Commission could, at most, recommend
prosecution, and the CIPEV had already taken that action.122
As the ICC investigation advanced, the executive branch came under increasing pressure to
provide a domestic forum to investigate the post-election atrocities. 123 One day before the ICC
Prosecutor was scheduled to name the suspects, President Kibaki announced that a “local judicial
mechanism” would be established to investigate the violence. 124 The government subsequently
challenged the admissibility of the Kenyatta and Ruto cases under Article 19.2(b) of the Rome Statute
on the grounds that the post-election violence was being investigated domestically.125 In fact, there
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is little evidence that police thoroughly investigated most of the crimes perpetrated by lower-level
officials—let alone crimes allegedly committed by Kenyatta and Ruto—during the post-election
violence.126 Moreover, any attempt to prosecute offenders for crimes against humanity would have
been futile, since the recently adopted law proscribing that offense was not retrospective.127
The government also highlighted the 2010 constitutional reforms as proof of Kenya’s
competence to investigate and prosecute the post-election violence.128 For example, after the first
motion to withdraw from the Rome Statute passed the Kenyan Parliament in 2010, President Kibaki
introduced several reforms, including nominating a new Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and
Director of Public Prosecutions.
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However, Parliament later declared the appointments

unconstitutional.
Ultimately, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the defendants’ Article 19 admissibility
challenge to the prosecutions. The Court found,130 and independent reports reiterated,131 that Kenya
failed to demonstrate that it was both capable of and had the political will to prosecute Kenyatta and
Ruto domestically (as opposed to investigating other aspects of the post-election violence). On
appeal, Kenya submitted a letter from the Director of Criminal Prosecutions stating that the
government had conducted thirty-five interviews and reviewed documents and had thus far found
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insufficient evidence to charge the defendants.132 However, the ICC Appeals Chamber held that “it
is not sufficient merely to assert that investigations are ongoing.” Moreover, “unless investigative
steps are actually taken in relation to the suspects who are the subject of the proceedings before the
Court, it cannot be said that the same case is (currently) under investigation by the Court and by a
national jurisdiction . . .”133
The admissibility ruling did not, however, deter the Kenyan government from waging a
blistering political campaign against the ICC, alternately accusing the Court of failing to adequately
equip Kenya to try the cases locally134 and, somewhat inconsistently, failing to acknowledge Kenya’s
desire to “move on.”135 Kenya’s Attorney General, for example, asserted that the Court’s failure to
help Kenya build capacity to prosecute lower-level crimes evidenced a lack of respect for its
sovereignty. And Kenya’s Director of Public Prosecutions, in a 2013 statement to the ICC Assembly
of States Parties, unfavorably compared the ICC’s activities in Kenya with the operation of the ICTR
in Rwanda, stating: “Rwanda is now able to prosecute genocide suspects because they were assisted
to build their legal and institutional framework. ICC has done zero for Kenya in that regard, yet that
is among the things we would demand and expect from the Court.”136
The AU also supported Kenya’s demands for a domestic investigation of Kenyatta and
Ruto.137 Beginning in 2001, the AU adopted the first of several Decisions tying the ICC proceedings
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to the powerful evolving narrative of the ICC as a political institution engaged in “race hunting.”138
During the 2013 Session, the AU issued a Decision supporting the deferral of the Kenyatta and Ruto
cases and advocating the creation of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights to try
international crimes.139 The Decision generated significant political pressure, reaffirming cumulative
language accusing the ICC of bias in AU Decisions dating back to 2009—well before the Kenyatta
and Ruto prosecutions. 140 Following the 2013 Decision, AU officials wrote to the ICC to request that
the prosecutions be halted pending a response to the organization’s demand that the cases be tried
domestically.141
E. Proposals to Prosecute International Crimes Before Regional Courts
The AU also attempted to establish a regional tribunal to prosecute international crimes.
However, insofar as arguments for regional prosecutions advocated a transfer of the proceedings
against Kenyatta and Ruto, they were clearly political rather than legal—the Rome Statute does not
provide a mechanism for the ICC to transfer ongoing prosecutions.
Although proposals for an African court with jurisdiction over international crimes date back
to 2004,142 the drive to undermine the ICC prosecutions of Kenyatta and Ruto reinvigorated these
initiatives.143 In 2008, the AU adopted a Protocol establishing the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights (“ACJHR”). 144 Two years later, the AU Commission appointed consultants to propose
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amendments to give the ACJHR the power to try international crimes. 145 In June 2014, the AU
approved an amendment to the ACJHR Protocol granting sitting Heads of State immunity before the
not-yet-operational regional court.146 As amended, Article 46(a)bis provides that the Heads of State
or Government of an AU member country are immune from prosecution during their terms in
office. 147 This provision creates a sharp divergence from other international criminal tribunals,
including the ICC, whose constitutive documents provide that sitting heads of state are not immune
from prosecution.148
Commentators had different responses to the Head of State immunity amendment to the
ACJHR Protocol. Some emphasized that because that regional court’s jurisdiction would not be
retrospective, it posed little threat to the prosecutions of Kenyatta and Ruto in the Hague.149 Others
expressed concern about what cases, if any, would fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction once the ACJHR
was operational, speculating that the immunity amendment would herald the demise of the ICC’s role
in Africa.150 Given the lack of any immediate impact on the prosecutions in the Hague, the proposal’s
aim was likely as much political as legal—to fuel opposition to the ICC support for alternative venues
for prosecuting international crimes that would not infringe the sovereignty of African nations.151
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F. Proposals to Amend the Rome Statute
Kenya proposed several amendments to the Rome Statute to be considered at the Twelfth
Session of the ICC Assembly of States Parties in November 2013. 152 The proposals addressed a
variety of issues related to the State’s objection to the Hague prosecutions of Kenyatta and Ruto—
expanding the reference to complementarity in the Rome Statute’s Preamble to cover regional courts;
granting immunity for Heads of State under Article 27 of the Statute; excusing defendants from
presence at trial under Article 63; and establishing an Independent Oversight Mechanism pursuant to
Article 112 to deal with offenses committed under Article 70.
By following the Rome Statute’s formal amendment procedures, Kenya appeared to be acting
cooperatively within the ICC framework. However, because the amendments were not submitted with
the three months’ notice required by Article 121 of the Rome Statute, they could not be adopted at
the November 2013 meeting.153 Thus, while the amendments were discussed, they were not subject
to the same level of scrutiny as amendments that could have been adopted at that session.
Notwithstanding this procedural defect, the amendments generated political pressure for reforms to
narrow the ICC’s ability to prosecute high-level political leaders. The amendments were discussed
again at the Thirteenth Session in December 2014, but the report noted without explanation the
“agreement that further discussions would be necessary.” 154 It seems that only the amendment
regarding the IOM was discussed again at the Fourteenth Session, where a resolution was adopted to
broaden the IOM’s authority.155
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1. Complementarity
Kenya’s proposed amendment to the Rome Statute’s Preamble would expand the doctrine of
complementarity to include regional investigation and prosecution mechanisms. 156 It reads:
“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national and regional criminal jurisdictions.” Presently, the Preamble only
discusses complementarity in the context of national courts. If adopted, the amendment would
provide a basis for ICC opponents to challenge future decisions by the Prosecutor not to defer to
African regional courts whose jurisdiction includes international crimes.
2.

Administration of Justice and Independent Oversight Mechanism

Article 70 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over intentional offenses against the
administration of justice including: giving false testimony under oath; presenting evidence that a party
knows is forged; interfering with witnesses; intimidating or corruptly influencing a court official and
retaliating against an official of the Court. The proposed amendment would clarify that these offenses
can be committed not only by defendants, witnesses, and attorneys but also by Court officials.157 In
support of this amendment, Kenya cited “the current situation in the Kenyan cases, especially Trial
Chamber V(b).” This appears to be a reference to the ICC Prosecutor’s allegations that Kenyan
officials interfered with prosecution witnesses (discussed in subsection H below), which defense
counsel challenged as both false and illustrative of pro-prosecution bias of Article 70.158
Kenya proposed another amendment that took aim at the prosecution—expanding the powers
of the Independent Oversight Mechanism (“IOM”).159 The IOM was created in 2009 pursuant to
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Article 112(4) of the Rome Statute with a narrow mandate—to investigate misconduct by staff,
elected officials, and contractors. 160 Kenya proposed that the IOM be given broader powers—to
investigate and inspect all organs of the Court, including the Office of the Prosecutor. 161 The
government emphasized that the Office is not currently subject to sufficient oversight because it “has
power to act independently and as a separate organ of the court with full authority over [its own]
management and administration . . . .”162 At its Fourteenth Session, the ASP adopted a resolution
broadening the IOM’s authority. 163 The resolution provides that the IOM may “receive and
investigate reports of misconduct or serious misconduct, including possible unlawful acts by . . . the
Prosecutor” and sets out a detailed procedure for conducting such investigations.164
3. Head of State Immunity
Kenya’s proposal to make Heads of State immune from prosecution during their terms in
office has its origins in an AU proposal to exempt sitting Heads of State from prosecutions for
international crimes. In January 2012, the AU decided to seek an advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice on the immunity of state officials under international law. 165 This
avenue was never pursued. Instead, at the Extraordinary Summit in October 2013, the AU decided
that heads of state were immune from prosecution during their terms of office, citing national law
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and international customary law.166 The AU also decided that states parties should “propose relevant
amendments to the Rome Statute” to give effect to this immunity.167
At the Twelfth Session of the ASP, Kenya proposed an amendment to Article 27 of the Rome
Statute.168 As written, Article 27 emphasizes that official capacity neither exempts an individual from
criminal responsibility nor serves as a valid basis for a reduced sentence.169 The amendment would
preclude prosecutions of serving heads of state, their deputies and anyone acting or entitled to act in
such a capacity. The AU requested a special session of the ASP to discuss the proposal.170 The session
produced heated debates, especially in the wake of the Security Council’s rejection of Kenya’s
deferral request a few days earlier.171
At the Thirteenth Session of the ASP in December 2014, Kenya clarified that the proposal’s
objective was not intended to definitively grant immunity to Heads of State, but rather to “pause”
prosecution during a political leader’s term in office.172 However, several delegations were concerned
about the proposal’s lack of precision and others were categorically opposed to modifying what they
considered a “cornerstone” of the Rome Statute. The proposal was not discussed at the Fourteenth
Session, although it may be discussed at a future meeting of the ASP.
G. Lobbying to Avoid Requiring the Accused’s Presence at Trial
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Kenyatta and Ruto worked both within and outside of the Rome Statute framework to avoid
appearing in-person at proceedings in the Hague. Within the framework, Kenya proposed
amendments to the Rome Statute and to the Rules of Procedure to allow for remote appearances.
Outside of the framework, the defendants made comments conditioning their cooperation upon the
Court’s agreeing to procedures to enable them to carry out their official duties.
Although during the election campaigns Kenyatta and Ruto maintained that their trials were
a personal matter, their narrative shifted after their victory.173 As Kenyatta warned the ICC in a
statement made after the election: “I speak not as an accused person, but as the President of the
sovereign Republic of Kenya. . . . If you want us to continue to cooperate let me make it clear that
when Ruto is in the Hague I will be here, and when I am in the Hague, Ruto will be here.” Kenyatta
later temporarily stepped down from office to participate in a hearing in his case.
Defense counsel for both Kenyatta and Ruto requested that both leaders be excused from
continuously attending their trials. In decisions issued in June 2013174 and October 2013,175 these
requests were conditionally granted by the respective ICC Trial Chambers. Commentators criticized
the legal basis of Trial Chamber V(a)’s initial decision excusing Ruto, which emphasized his
constitutional duties as Deputy President in language reminiscent of the AU’s letter and thus could
be seen as a partial recognition of immunity for a sitting head of state.176
Commentators have speculated that the ICC rulings were influenced by the officials’
assertions that the trials would disrupt their governmental duties, which, in turn, gave the impression
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that the judges could be politically manipulated.177 For instance, the Trial Chamber initially rejected
Ruto’s request for alternating trials, which would have allowed either Kenyatta or Ruto to be present
in Kenya at all times. However, during a status conference one day before the trials were scheduled
to begin, the judge presiding over Trial Chamber V(a) announced that he preferred to try the cases in
four week alternating blocks because “running the cases simultaneously will not necessarily expedite
them.”178 This announcement came one day after Kenyatta conditioned cooperation with the ICC on
the requirement that he and Ruto not be required to attend trials at The Hague simultaneously.
On July 29, 2013 the Prosecutor filed an appeal in the Ruto case. Several African states,
including Tanzania, Rwanda, Eritrea, Uganda and Burundi, sought leave to file amicus curiae briefs
supporting Ruto’s excusal under Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 179
Commentators speculated that the Appeals Chamber order granting these countries permission to file
amicus briefs was influenced by the Kenyan Attorney General’s statement that “the ICC gives more
hearing to civil society than it does to State Parties.”180 The governments’ briefs included extrajudicial statements supporting Kenyan’s position. Rwanda, for example, suggested that it would
refuse to join the ICC if the issue was not resolved in the defendant’s favor.181 Regardless, the Appeals
Chamber unanimously reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision on October 25, 2013.182 The Appeals
Chamber concluded that by providing Ruto with “a blanket excusal” before the trial even
commenced, “making his absence the general rule and his presence the exception,” the Trial Chamber
abused its discretion.183
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In a September 2013 letter, the AU criticized the Appeals Chamber’s ruling.184 The letter
emphasized that the defendant’s inability to participate in crucial diplomatic events would hinder
peace, security and stability, both nationally and regionally. The letter also portrayed the Appeals
Chamber’s decision as inconsistent with a proper consideration of Ruto’s constitutional
responsibilities. The AU later encouraged Kenya to propose amendments to the Rome Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence to facilitate excusing defendants who are sitting government
officials.
Kenya proposed a pair of amendments shortly thereafter. The first was to Article 63(2) of the
Rome Statute. Article 63(2) provides for trial in the absence of the accused in exceptional
circumstances without elaborating on what qualifies as an exceptional circumstance. The amendment
provides that “an accused may be excused from continuous presence in the Court after the Chamber
satisfies itself that exceptional circumstances exist, alternative measures have been put in place and
considered, including but not limited to changes to the trial schedule or temporary adjournment or
attendance through the use of communications technology or through representation of counsel.” The
provision then states that “[a]ny such absence shall be considered on a case-by-case basis and be
limited to that which is strictly necessary.”185
Kenya also proposed an amendment to Rule 134 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to
excuse heads of state from being personally present at trial.186 Unlike an amendment to the Rome
Statute, such an amendment could take effect immediately. The Twelfth Session of the Assembly of
States Parties adopted by consensus Rule 134quater, which provides that “an accused subject to a
summons to appear who is mandated to fulfill extraordinary public duties at the highest national level
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may submit a written request to the Trial Chamber to be excused and to be represented by counsel
only.”187 Pursuant to Rule 134quater, Ruto submitted an new excusal request.188 The Trial Chamber
V(a) conditionally granted the request, requiring Ruto to be present only at specific hearings.189 It
also denied the Prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal.190
Kenyatta followed a different approach, invoking Article 143(7) of the Kenyan Constitution
to temporarily step down in favor of Ruto as acting President the country—the first time that this
provision of the Constitution had ever been invoked.191 Explaining his decision, Kenyatta stated:
“Nothing in my position or my deeds as President warrants my being in court.… Therefore, let it not
be said that I am attending the status conference as the President of Kenya.” 192 Kenyatta also
reasserted his view that the trials were an affront to the nation’s sovereignty: “I chose not to put the
sovereignty of more than 40 million Kenyans on trial since their democratic will should never be
subject to another jurisdiction.”193
H. Non-Cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor
Throughout the cases, the Prosecutor criticized the Kenyan government for recalcitrance in
handing over evidence and facilitating access to critical witnesses. 194 That non-cooperation
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contributed to delays in the proceedings and, eventually, to the dismissal of the cases against Kenyatta
and Muthuara—decisions that news reports described as “an unprecedented admission of failure by
Prosecutors.”195
In Kenyatta’s case, the Prosecutor sought a finding of noncompliance against the government
based on its failure to respond to requests for financial and other records.196 The Attorney General
responded that a ruling by Kenyan courts was required to compel the government to hand over the
requested documents.197 The Trial Chamber disagreed, ruling that: “Any purported deficiency in
domestic legal procedures cannot be raised . . . as a shield to protect a state party from its obligation
to cooperate with the court . . . .”198 It also noted “at the very least, the possibility of a potential
conflict of interests in this case” regarding the duty of persons or organs acting on the State’s behalf
to comply with the requests. Although the Trial Chamber did not make a formal finding of
noncompliance, it noted that the government had “unjustifiably frustrated” the investigation.199
In an attempt to strengthen its case against the defendants, the Prosecution procured a
summons from the Trial Chamber ordering the Kenyan government to employ “all means available
under the law of Kenya” to bring eight witnesses before the Court.200 The Court also signaled that it
would not tolerate attempts to undermine the Prosecutor’s investigation. For example, in 2013 the
ICC unsealed an arrest warrant for Walter Barasa, who had allegedly corrupted ICC witnesses.201
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Kenya’s response was recalcitrance. In a written submission on May 10, 2013, the Prosecutor
informed the ICC of “reports received from prosecution witnesses that they have been targeted by
[government] officials seeking to influence their testimony,” adding that “[s]ome public officials in
Kenya have fostered an anti-ICC climate in Kenya . . . .”202 The Prosecutor cited this climate when
discussing the “unprecedented level of witness interference” that plagued the investigations. In the
absence of reliable witness testimony, the Prosecutor was forced to concede that there was insufficient
evidence to try President Kenyatta. Ultimately, the case was dismissed due to a lack of evidence.203
The dismissal cannot, however, be entirely attributed to Kenya’s refusal to turn over
documents and its alleged interference with witnesses. Commentators have noted that some
evidentiary gaps may be attributed to the Prosecutor’s early mishandling of the case,204 and the Trial
Chamber itself expressed “serious concerns” about the “timeliness and thoroughness” of the
Prosecutor’s work. Some of the government’s recalcitrance may also be attributed to ordinary pretrial
tactics. However, the Kenyan government deployed these tactics at least in part to tarnish the public
perception of the ICC. For example, Attorney General Githu Muigai criticized the Prosecutor for
requesting a delay to gather evidence in Kenyatta’s case. “Where did the evidence go?” he asked
when adamantly asserting that if such critical evidence were absent the Court should never have
confirmed the proceedings.205
That criticism added to the ICC’s image crisis in Kenya. A sampling of local headlines
included the titles: “Githu Muigai Rocks the ICC as he Teaches Bensouda and ICC Judges Some
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Law”206 As previously noted, the public initially voiced strong support for trying the defendants in
The Hague.207 Opinion polls indicated that the central reasons for early public support for the Hague
proceedings were the belief that the trials would end impunity and that the national judiciary was illequipped to handle the cases. 208 However, as the cases progressed, public support declined. 209
Commentators traced this decline to two factors linked to the government’s recalcitrance—the
Prosecutor’s decision to drop the charges against Francis Muthuara, and the seemingly perpetual
delay of the trials.210
I. Rhetoric Politicizing the ICC Trials
As previously explained, Ruto and Kenyatta’s 2013 election campaign invoked the ICC
prosecutions for political gain, using ethnic and political rhetoric to chill domestic support for the
prosecutions. Although most references to the ICC were oblique, and Kenyatta and Ruto professed
their intention to cooperate fully with the Court, their campaign rhetoric was replete with language
of anti-colonialism and self-determination that helped to fuel later opposition to the prosecutions.211
For example, leaders cited comments by the U.S. Ambassador that the election of the indicted
Kenyatta would have “consequences” as an illustration of Western manipulation. The campaigns also
highlighted statements by United Kingdom diplomats warning that if Kenyatta were elected, that the
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U.K, country would minimize diplomatic contact with Kenya. 212 The candidates also framed the
prosecutions as Western indictments of Kenyatta and Ruto’s respective ethnic communities.213
Kenyatta’s nationalist rhetoric against the ICC increased after he assumed the Presidency. The
keynote speaker at the inauguration congratulated the Kenyan people for rejecting the “blackmail of
the ICC,” alleging that Western governments were using the Court to “install leaders of their choice
in Africa and eliminate the ones they do not like.” 214 Kenyatta’s presidential speech was more
equivocal, asserting that the defendants would comply with the ICC but also that they expected the
Court to “respect our sovereignty.”215 The anti-ICC rhetoric intensified in the weeks leading up to
Kenyatta’s October 2014 hearing at the Hague, which Kenyatta attended in his private capacity to
avoid putting “the sovereignty of more than forty million Kenyans on trial.”216
V.

Three Overarching Themes of the Kenyan Backlash against the ICC
The narratives above illustrate the different ways in which the Kenyan government expressed

its strident opposition to the prosecutions of Kenyatta and Ruto, undermining the legal and political
legitimacy of the ICC in Kenya, among other African states, and in the African Union. When viewed
together, these discrete instances of opposition amount to an integrated strategy of backlash against
the Court that is characterized by several unifying themes. This Part explains these themes and
explores their legal and political consequences.
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A. Cloaking Sovereignty Claims in Arguments about Complementarity
In lobbying the AU for support of an Article 16 deferral of the prosecutions, and in
requesting such a deferral from the UN Security Council, Kenya capitalized on a tension at the heart
of the Rome Statute—the careful compromise between international criminal justice and state
sovereignty. 217 Specifically, the government strategically manipulated the key legal concept that
embodies that delicate balance—the principle of complementarity.

218

Government officials

repeatedly employed complementarity to frame the ICC trials as an affront to Kenyan sovereignty.
This section illustrates the government’s efforts to link complementarity and sovereignty in three
ways: (1) politicizing complementarity, (2) eliding positive and negative complementarity, and (3)
raising complementarity arguments that are not legally viable.
1. Politicizing Complementarity
As previously discussed, the National Assembly never adopted a bill to create a Special
Tribunal for Kenya. 219 This did not, however, deter the Kenyan government from raising
complementarity arguments once it became clear that the ICC prosecutions would proceed. One such
argument featured prominently in the Assembly’s 2010 motion to withdraw from the Rome Statute.
Expressly citing complementarity, the motion resolved that “any further criminal investigations or
prosecutions arising out of the post-election violence” should be undertaken at the national level in
light of the new Kenyan Constitution promulgated in 2010. The 2010 Constitution included reforms
aimed at improving judicial independence and competence, 220 which the Assembly asserted as a
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fundamental change in circumstances justifying the ICC to step back from its prosecutions of
Kenyatta and Ruto.221
Debate in the National Assembly over the unanimously-adopted motion suggests that the
invocation of complementarity was part of a broader political strategy. By linking complementarity
to respect for sovereignty, the government situated the withdrawal motion within a larger narrative
framing the prosecutions as a Western effort to manipulate Kenyan domestic politics.222 For example,
the Energy Minister remarked: “It is only Africans from former colonies who are being tried at the
ICC . . . . No British or American will be tried at the ICC and we should not willingly allow ourselves
to return to colonialism.”223 The 2010 motion thus implied that the ICC’s “failure” to transfer the
cases to a domestic or regional forum was evidence that the Court was carrying out the will of Western
governments.
2. Eliding Positive and Negative Complementarity
Literature on the Rome Statute distinguishes between two types of complementarity: negative
and positive. Negative complementarity reflects the principle that the ICC should not investigate or
prosecute international crimes where a state with jurisdiction over such crimes is able and willing to
do so. Positive complementarity, on the other hand, refers to the ICC’s affirmative duty to promote
national trials by taking measures including, but not limited to, directly assisting national prosecutions
through the transfer of evidence, establishing training programs for police and national prosecutors,
and encouraging specific states to investigate particular crimes.224
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The Rome Statute’s admissibility standards expressly incorporate negative complementarity.
Under Article 17(1)(a), for example, the ICC cannot take cognizance of a case if a State with
jurisdiction is conducting an investigation, “unless the State is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry
out the investigation or prosecution.” 225 In contrast, no provision of the Rome Statute expressly
recognizes the positive complementarity principle.
The first ICC Chief Prosecutor nevertheless interpreted the principle as a tool for promoting
national criminal proceedings. 226 During a 2004 strategy discussion, for example, Luis MorenoOcampo stated that the Office of the Prosecutor would take “a positive approach to complementarity.
Rather than competing with national systems for jurisdiction, we will encourage national proceedings
wherever possible.”227 Although the Prosecutor’s early interpretation of the Rome Statute suggested
that ICC would facilitate domestic prosecutions, such an approach has not been followed in cases
referred to the Court.228
Although the two types of complementarity are distinct conceptually, in terms of their legal
foundations, and in the actions they require of ICC officials, the Kenyan government intentionally
elided these distinctions and portrayed positive complementarity as part of the ICC’s affirmative
mandate. This strategy enabled the government to dexterously deflect attention away from the
absence of domestic investigations of Kenyatta and Ruto (as opposed to investigations of the postelection violence in general) and to frame the ICC’s failure to employ positive complementarity as
proof that international prosecutions showed a lack of respect for Kenyan sovereignty.
The government’s demand that the ICC defer to a national or regional alternative to
prosecutions in the Hague are among the clearest illustrations of this conceptual slight-of-hand. In
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March 2011, Kenya challenged the admissibility of the prosecutions against Kenyatta and Ruto under
Article 19 of the Rome Statute on the ground that the government was investigating or prosecuting
the case domestically. According to the government, “challeng[ing] Kenya’s right to try its own
citizens in the present circumstances would send out the wrong message to countries that are seeking
to strengthen their national jurisdictions to fulfill their obligations under the Rome Statute . . . .”229
This statement implies that the ICC has an obligation to build domestic capacity to facilitate the
prosecution of international crimes. The statement also links the purported obligation to promote
positive complementarity to respect for Kenyan sovereignty.
Kenyan officials also used the elision strategy in their political rhetoric against the Court.
Specifically, the government alternately accused the ICC of failing to adequately equip Kenya to try
the cases locally230 and failing to acknowledge the Kenyan people’s desire to “move on.”231
3. Raising Complementarity Arguments Without a Basis in International Law
The Kenyan government also raised complementarity arguments that had no basis in
international law. For example, both Kenya and the AU repeatedly cited complementarity in support
of their deferral requests to the UNSC. However, commentators generally agree that complementarity
is not a legally valid basis for deferral, which instead turns on whether allowing a prosecution to
continue threatens international peace and security.232
The references to complementarity in these requests in fact served a different objective—
framing the ICC as a political tribunal pitted against African sovereignty and African governments.
By repeatedly invoking complementarity in multiple deferral requests, Kenya and the AU bolstered
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their argument that the ICC was implicitly disrespecting Africa by prosecuting its political leaders
and judging its local and regional mechanisms inadequate. Cumulatively, the appeals to
complementarity fueled the narrative that the ICC prosecutions represented the West’s stubborn
refusal to respect Kenya’s sovereignty by facilitating domestic investigation and prosecution of the
defendants. This narrative served bolstered the defendants’ domestic popularity, increased public
hostility to the ICC, and framed the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto as exemplars of a broader
regional concern rather than a Kenya-specific problem.
B. Regionalizing Backlash: Making the Prosecutions a Pan-African Concern
The trials of Kenya’s President and Deputy President for crimes committed during a
Kenyan election was unquestionably a pressing national concern. Yet the government skillfully
reframed the prosecutions as a pan-African problem by presenting them as the latest salvo in a long
line of affronts to the sovereignty of all African nations. This regionalization strategy served two
primary ends: it increased the political pressure on the ICC, and it deflected concerns about impunity
by diverting focus from the defendants to a wider political context. The strategy is especially evidence
in Kenya’s efforts to lobby the UNSC for an Article 16 deferral and its encouraging an en masse
withdrawal from the Rome Statute by African Union member states.
1. Involving the African Union in Lobbying the Security Council for a Deferral
As discussed in Section III(A), Kenyan officials recognized that their request for a
UNSC deferral was unlikely succeed. The government used the failure of its request to regionalize
concerns about the Kenyatta and Ruto prosecutions. The key to that strategy was drawing on the
tensions surrounding the ICC prosecution of Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir. In that case, the
UNSC did not respond to either of the African Union Peace and Security Council’s two formal
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requests to defer the proceedings. The feelings of disrespect aroused by the UNSC’s nonresponsiveness culminated in the AU’s decision not to assist in al-Bashir’s arrest.233
The Kenyan government capitalized on the momentum that the al-Bashir case generated by
seeking AU backing before submitting its own deferral request. That choice allow Kenya to reframe
the UNSC’s denial of the request as the next step in a larger narrative of acrimonious Africa-ICC
relations. When the UNSC did not respond to Kenya’s first deferral request, the consequences were
markedly pan-African. In May 2013, for example, the AU adopted its “Decision on Africa’s
Relationship with the International Criminal Court,” which frames the prosecutions as an insult to
African sovereignty. The Decision emphasizes “the need for international justice to be conducted in
a transparent and fair manner, in order to avoid any perception of double standard” and notes that the
prosecutions pose a threat to regional peace and security. And in October 2013, after its Extraordinary
Summit, the AU issued a decision stating that President Kenyatta would not appear before the ICC
until the UNSC considered Kenya’s deferral request.
These efforts helped to push Kenya’s second deferral request to a vote in the UNSC in
November 2013. As discussed in Section III(A), the resolution seeking a deferral was not adopted.
However, because the request was linked to the tensions of the al-Bashir case, its rejection reinforced
Kenya’s claim that the UNSC did not give sufficient credence to the views of African governments.
The vote thus cemented the prosecutions’ place in a narrative that, by virtue of the number of nations
involved, posed a far graver threat to the ICC’s legitimacy than a stand-off with Kenya alone. That
broader narrative also deflected attention from the defendants’ actions, stymying accusations of
impunity.
2. Raising En Masse Withdrawal Before the African Union
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As explained in Section III(B), the Kenyan Parliament adopted two motions to
withdraw from the Rome Statute—the first in 2011 and the second in 2013. The latter motion helped
to precipitate the African-wide withdrawal proposal that Kenya made brought before the AU during
the October 2013 Extraordinary Summit. The motion thus further illustrates Kenya’s efforts at
regionalizing its conflict with the ICC.
The 2013 motion passed in Kenyan Parliament but President Kenyatta did not act upon the
motion.234 Rather than taking the bold and unprecedented step of withdrawing from the Rome Statute
unilaterally, Kenyatta sought AU support for a collective ICC withdrawal. The Parliament’s adoption
of the motion aided that effort in at least three ways: first, by demonstrating strong domestic support
for the proposal; second, by signaling that politically powerful Kenya was committed to en masse
withdrawal; and third, by cloaking the proposal in the mantle of democratic legitimacy. Had Kenyatta
and Ruto approached the AU without the Parliament’s backing, opponents might well have framed
the proposal as an attempt to secure de facto impunity, making the AU less willing to champion
Kenya’s cause.
Excerpts of the speech that Kenyatta gave at the Extraordinary Summit, included in Section
III(C), portray collective withdrawal as a necessary reaction to the ICC’s “targeting” of Africa. The
speech thus contributed to the overarching narrative that Kenya used to garner regional support for
its opposition to the Court. Although AU member states ultimately decided against en masse
withdrawal, the fact that the largest regional block of Rome Statute signatories gave the proposal
serious consideration sent a strong political message to the ICC.
C. Coupling Condemnation with Cooperation to Diffuse Accusations of Impunity
Kenyatta and Ruto’s concerted campaign against the ICC was, somewhat paradoxically, also
marked by periodic public commitments to cooperate with the proceedings in the Hague. These shows
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of cooperation served several purposes. First, they enhanced the defendants’ popularity in Kenya,
ultimately helping to turn public opinion against the ICC. Second, the supposed willingness to
cooperate likely made the government’s backlash more palatable to other AU member states,
generating regional support that enabled Kenya to place more political pressure on the ICC than it
could have generated on its own.
1. The 2013 Presidential Elections
The approach the defendants took to during the 2013 election campaign illustrates the
effectiveness of combining cooperation and backlash. Although the ICC prosecutions initially
enjoyed widespread support from the Kenyan public, that support did not survive the defendants’
2013 election. During the 2007 presidential elections that precipitated the post-election violence
Kenyatta and Ruto were political opponents. After the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charges
against them, the defendants formed the Jubilee Coalition that united different ethnic groups.
In light of the trials’ initial popularity, the defendants shrewdly avoided running an
exclusively anti-ICC campaign. Instead, they promised to cooperate with the prosecutions. In
assuring the public of their cooperation, the pair framed the indictments as personal matters that
would not interfere with their ability to govern. They also avoided the appearance of shirking
accountability for the violence that followed the 2007 elections. The strategy appeared to succeed, in
that public support for the two candidates increased even as ICC prosecutions remained popular in
the run-up to the 2013 presidential elections.
At the same time, Kenyatta and Ruto villainized the ICC prosecutions as a threat to the
sovereignty of Kenya and of Africa in general. They also portrayed the prosecutions as an attempt by
the West to favor its preferred candidate, Odinga, and to dissuade the Kenyan people from voting for
Kenyatta. At first, the defendants focused more on cooperation than on criticizing the ICC. But as the
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pair gained in popularity, their rhetoric against the Court increased as the public became more open
to the anti-ICC narrative they offered up.
After the election and their assumption of the Presidency and Deputy Presidency respectively,
Kenyatta and Ruto increasingly framed their trials as disrespectful of Kenya’s sovereignty. For
example, in a statement made after his election Kenyatta warned: “I speak not as an accused person,
but as the President of the sovereign Republic of Kenya . . . . ”235 Polling reflects this strategy’s
effectiveness, revealing the defendants’ election as one cause of the decline in public support for the
ICC prosecutions. Yet both officials continued to emphasize their individual cooperation with the
ICC process even after their elections—a position that was consistent with their campaign promises
and likely kept accusations of impunity at bay.
2. Kenyatta’s Appearance in the Hague in October 2014
Perhaps the best illustration of the defendants’ savvy in making shows of cooperation while
undermining the Court is Kenyatta’s dexterous handling of his appearance at a status conference in
the Hague in October 2014. By agreeing to appear in person, Kenyatta made a show of cooperation—
one that he drew attention to in his April 2014 presidential address.236 But he also undermined the
trials by temporarily stepping down as the President of Kenya. Kenyatta framed this decision as
necessary to “avoid putting the sovereignty of more than forty million Kenyans on trial,” thereby
implying that the prosecution of the country’s sitting President evidenced the ICC”s disrespect for
Kenyan sovereignty.237 Kenyatta’s decision was widely supported238 and particularly dramatic given
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that the constitutional provision he invoked to temporarily transfer presidential power to Ruto had
never before been used.
VI.

Conclusion
The efforts by the Government of Kenya to oppose the ICC prosecutions of President

Kenyatta and Deputy President Ruto were many and varied. Although previous studies have viewed
these efforts as discrete and unrelated, a closer examination reveals that the government’s actions
were part of an integrated backlash strategy linked by several overarching themes.
First, Kenyan officials capitalized on ambiguities in the complementarity doctrine to recast
the ICC trials as an affront to the country’s sovereignty. The government also framed the prosecutions
as a pan-African concern—the latest in a long line of post-colonial Western impositions on African
nations. Third, Kenya publicly emphasized its cooperation with the ICC while simultaneously acting
in ways that undercut the prosecutions. All three aspects of the backlash campaign included
maneuvers within the framework of the ICC legal regime—such pre-trial motions and requests for
the UN Security Council to defer the prosecutions—as well as actions taken outside of that
framework—including attempts to delegitimize the Court and proposals for a region-wide withdrawal
from the Rome Statute.
The success of Kenya’s integrated backlash strategy – as indicated in the dismissal of the
prosecutions, the reduction in public and government support for the ICC across Africa – offer a
troubling roadmap for other states to oppose prosecutions before the ICC as well as ad hoc or hybrid
criminal tribunals. By manipulating ambiguous doctrines, challenging the legal basis for prosecutions
using geopolitical arguments that appeal to neighboring countries, and by tacitly refusing to cooperate
with ongoing proceedings while publicly (but disingenuously) professing to recognize the authority
of the court, its judges and staff, opponents of international justice can obfuscate and delay
proceedings until the prosecution is forced to make a sua sponte decision to dismiss the indictments.
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Whether similar backlash strategies will be effective for other international courts and
tribunals is less certain. Criminal trials require the presence of the accused and the proceedings
included procedural safeguards and due process protections that give strategic leverage not only to
defendants and their council also but to state officials who support them. The same rules do not apply
to international courts that adjudicate state responsibility for violating human rights, trade and
investment rules, environmental protection agreements, and other public international law
obligations. If a court has jurisdiction over a state by virtue of its membership in a treaty regime, the
judges on the tribunal will review the merits of the case – and, where appropriate, declare violations
of the law and award appropriate remedies – regardless of whether the government and its officials
participate in the proceedings. With a favorable judgment in hand, legal advocates and their clients
can deploy a range of strategies to pressure the state to respond. They can seek to enforce the ruling
domestically, publicize the judges’ reasoning and findings to bolster the legitimacy of their demands,
and use the ruling to embarrass political leaders into adopting their preferred legal and policy reforms.
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